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Bulletin No. 74 of the U. S. Bureau of Labor, dated January,
I9O8, and issued in May, is a document of the utmost importance
to anyone who is interested in the subject of Employers' Liability.
We know of no publication which can be compared with it for
complete presentation of the present status of that subject. It begins
with an admirable treatise of 120 pages on the American law upon
the subject, which is followed by the text of all American consti-
tutions and statutes which alter the common law, including the
statutes of i9o7. To this is added a clear statement of the law
of each of the European countries and their dependencies as to
employer's liability, with the full text of the British Workmen's
Compensation Act of 19o6, and of the Canadian Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act of I9o7; and a statement of the more important
decisions of American courts on labor questions during the past
year. This statement of the contents will show that the pamphlet is
indispensable to any one who desires to investigate any phase of this
most important subject. E.P.
DAMAGES UPON REPUDIATION OF A CONTRACT.
In the April number of this journal Professor Joseph H. Beale,
Jr., sets forth very clearly the principles governing the measure of
damages in cases of anticipatory repudiation of a contract. It seems
to the writer than in one respect only is a criticism to be made of
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his analysis. Professor Beale shows convincingly that where "the
plaintiff sues at once for an anticipatory breach of the contract, his
damages are to be assessed according to the cost of performance,
not at the time of the breach, but at the time set for performance."
To this rule, however, he says there may be one exception: where
parties have made a contract for the future delivery of a commodity
of such a nature that the right to its future delivery has a present
market value, and an anticipatory breach occurs, the measure of
the damages is not the value of the contract at the time for per-
formance, but the value of the contract at the time of the
breach. The example given is a sale of oats for July delivery, and
a repudiation occurs in April. July oats have a market value in
April representing the April value of the contract right to July oats.
It is submitted that even such a case as this is no exception to the
general rule.
In the first place, all contract rights to a future performance have
a present value, and in every case such value is different from the
value of performance at the time set by the contract, and different
from the value of a precisely similar performance at the present time.
The fact that some contract rights or "futures" are quoted on an
exchange while others are not, has no bearing upon the underlying
principle. That fact merely goes to show that in some cases there
is in existence first class evidence of the present value of a contract
right to a future performance, while in other cases there may be
little or none. This might be a pracfical reason for laying down
different rules for the measure of damages in the two cases, but it
is not a logical one. It may indeed be true that in all cases of an
anticipatory breach the injured party should be given the present
market value of his contract right as of the time of such breach.
He ought not to complain at such a rule, for he himself is a con-
senting party. In all cases he has his option between acquiescing
in the repudiation and rejecting it; and he should reject it in case
he wishes the value of the contract at the time set for performance.
This is a question forced upon us by the anticipatory breach doctrine
as discovered in Hochster v. Delatour. But as Professor Beale
shows, the question is no longer open, and the rule as to the measure
of damages is that quoted at the beginning of this discussion.
In the second place, Professor Beale's reasons for the rule that
"the repudiator of a contract cannot under any circumstances call
upon the other party to make forward contracts for his benefit"
are almost as conclusive against allowing the repudiator of a con-
tract to escape on paying the market value of the contract right as
COMMENTS
of the time of the anticipatory breach. Allowing the injured party
only that amount, is in effect requiring him to make a forward con-
tract for the benefit of the repudiator, depriving him of any benefit
from the forward contract, though insuring him against any loss
from it. The fact that the injured party is insurdd against any loss
to accrue from the forward contract does not add to the merit of the
rule. If anything, it detracts from it. The injilred party has fore-
casted the future. He is entitled to profits accruing after the antici-
patory breach as well as before. But to get them he must now make
a forward contract based upon a new forecast. If the injured
party's original forecast was bad, he should bear the losses conse-
quent thereon, those accruing subsequent to the breach as well as
before. In this case, he is not in fact an injured party at all.
The repudiation is not an injury but a positive benefit. -Yet the
rule would require the repudiator to pay damages for conferring
a benefit; or to express it in another way, would require the
repudiator to pay the damages caused by the making of the forward
contract. As Professor Beale says: "The fact is that the repu-
diator is entitled to the benefit of no contract of the other party
except such as the other party could not have made but for the
repudiation." And likewise, the fact is that the repudiator should
be made to bear the burden of no contract except that which he
has himself made.
Suppose the following: A sells to B i,ooo bushels of wheat at
$I.o0 per bushel for delivery July i. On April i, wheat having
risen, and July wheat being then quoted at $i.io, A repudiates.
Wheat continues to rise in price, and on July i is quoted at $1.20
for immediate delivery. Under these circumstances, B should be
entitled to $200.00. If on April i B makes a forward purchase
for July delivery of another i,ooo bushels of wheat at $i.io, he
is entitled to his profit of $ioo.oo thereon, in addition to the
$2oo.oo on the first contract. But if B can hold A for damages
based only upon the April price of July wheat, then B gets only
$2oo.oo profit on the two contracts instead of $300.00. Again,
suppose that after April i the price of wheat declines and on July
i is once more $I.o0 per bushel for immediate delivery. On July
i, the time for performance, B could buy in the market for $i.00,
the contract price, and has lost nothing by reason of A's repudiation
and non-performance. He should therefore not be given $io0.o0
of A's money. In case B made a forward contract on April i, as
before, at $I.Io, the $oo.o0 loss thereon should not be borne by A.
In case B sues A and the trial occurs before July i, the thing
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to be proved is the prospective value of the wheat on July I,
although the best evidence of what it will be is perhaps the market
quotation of July wheat at the day of trial. A. L. C.
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ERDMANN ACT OF 1898.
The Supreme Court of the United States dealt a deadly blow to
labor unions in a recent decision, Adair v. United States, 28 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 277, holding unconstitutional section io of the Erdmanti Act
passed in i898, for this cut out the very heart of the entire Act. The
real question in the case was, may Congress make it a criminal
offence against the United States-as, by the ioth section of the Act
of 1898, it does,-for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier,
having full authority in the premises from the carrier, to dis-
charge an employee from service simply because of his member-
ship in a labor organization? The majority of the court based their
opinion on the fact that in interfering with freedom of contract it
was an unwarranted invasion of the right to personal liberty and
property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Also that the Act was
not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. 8, of
the Constitution, One dissenting Justice argues that because of the
purpose, to wit: the prevention of strikes, it is not a "gross per-
version of the principle" of regulation and that because of the nature
of the rights, namely, those exercised in a quasi-public business, they
are subject to control in the interest of the public. The other dis-
senting Justice, admitting it to be a limited interference with free-
dom of contract, attempts to justify it on the grounds of public
policy.
The rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment are some-
thing more than mere privileges of locomotion; the guaranty is
the negation of arbitrary power in every form which results in a
deprivation of a right. It is well recognized, however, that this
right is limited to a certain extent by the "police power," both in
the States (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 391),and in Congress,whose
power, however, is not general but rests upon the enumerated powers
given it by the Constitution. Vid., dissenting opinion, Lottery Case,
188 U. S. 365; Freund on Police Power, Sec. 65. But this must not
be a mere pretext-become another and delusive name for supreme
sovereignty-to be exercised free from constitutional restraint.
Lotkner v. New York, ig U. S. 56.
Going now to the second ground on which the unconstitutionality
is put, denying that the government can invoke the aid of the com-
merce clause to sustain the indictmentraising as it does a much more
complex and embarrassingly difficult constitutional question and
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touching the fundamental power which is the source from which
the authority to pass such an act must flow, is much broader and
more comprehensive in its results than the first part of the majority
opinion. The power of Congress to regulate commerce should not
be tested solely by abstractly considering the particular subject to
which a regulation relates, for instance, master and servant. The
reason is obvious and the contention derives some plausibility from
its very vagueness. The test should be, is the regulation embraced
within the grant conferred on Congress to use all lawful means
necessary and appropriate to the execution of the power to regulate
commerce.
Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, said Chief Justice Marshall,
but it is something more, it is intercourse (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheaton 189), and the power to regulate it extends to the persons
who conduct it as well as to the instruments used. Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 12 Howard 36. Still this does not mean as to their
general conduct but only in respect to that which directly concerns
interstate commerce. See dissenting opinion by Justice Moody in
Employers' Liability Cases, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. I1. The act in ques-
tion hardly comes within the test laid down above, for first it is
not in its nature national, so as to require only one uniform system
of regulation (Gloucester Ferry v. Penn., 114 U. S. 196), for the
practical results of the statute passed upon cannot be considered
as coming within the true spirit and purpose of the Constitution
as being a matter "to which the separate States are incompetent, or
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual legislation" creating invidious distinctions
arising from local interests. Madison's Journal, Scott Ed., 67 et seq.
Furthermore, it only indirectly, remotely and incidentally affects the
operation of interstate commerce (Hooper v. Cal., 155 U. S. 648-
655), unless possibly it tends to increase the efficiency of the service,
as by prescribing actual qualifications for the employees (Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U. S. 465-479), or was to promote the safety of em-
ployees (Johnson v.Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. i), and as it accom-
plishes neither it concededly falls far from being within such test
but is a mere regulation between employe and employer. And surely
it cannot be said as was very aptly put by Justice White in the
Employers' Liability Cases, supra: "that because one engages in
interstate commerce he thereby submits all his business concerns to
the regulating power of Congress. To state the proposition is to
refute it." The words "whim, caprice, prejudice and malice,"
quoted from Cooley on Torts, 278, pushed the effect of the aecision
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as far as it was possible for it to go, which was about twice as
far as it would have gone without them. But the developing power
of public opinion growing out of the changed economic conditions
of our country will doubtless affect in the future, as it has in the
past, the adaptability of the unchanging provisions of our Constitu-
tion to the infinite variety of the ever-changing conditions of our
national life.
BOYCOTT AS COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE UNDER THE
ANTI-TRUST ACT.
There have been numerous decisions in the courts of the United
States during the last year that have adversely affected the interests
of labor unions, and severely crippled their efforts to obtain more
favorable labor conditions, but perhaps none have been more shock-
ing to the tactics of these organizations in dealing with their indus-
trial enemies than that of Loewe v. Lawlor, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301,
known as the "Danbury Hatters Case," decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in February, 19o8. The facts were that
the plaintiff was a manufacturer of hats, and was engaged in inter-
state trade in some twenty States. The defendants were members
of the United Hatters of North America, and were combined with
the American Federation of Labor in a scheme and effort to force
all manufacturers of hats in the United States, including the plaintiff,
to unionize their shops, and upon the refusal of the plaintiff to
accede to their demands, they declared a boycott and effectuaily
used their widespread influence to prevent the plaintiff from selling
his hats to the wholesale dealers and purchasers in the several
States, and to prevent the dealers and customers in the several
States from buying the same. The plaintiff brought his action under
the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. at Large 210, which
provides that "every contract, combination, in the nature of a trust,
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States" is void, and claimed threefold damages as
allowed for injuries declared to be illegal under the act. The court
held that the defendants were engaged in the "restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States" in the sense in which these
words were used in the act, and based its conclusion on numerous
previous judgments to the effect that the act prohibits any com-
bination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the
free flow of commerce between the States, or restricts in that regard
the liberty of a trader to engage in business.
It was at one time vigorously contended that this statute was
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to be construed to apply to the purposes announced by its title-
"An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against 'unlawful'
restraints "--hence we were to look to the common law in deter-
mining what restraints of trade were unlawful, and, whereas the
common law recognized reasonable restraints of trade as lawful, the
act could apply only to unreasonable restraints. But when the ques-
tion came before the Supreme Court, it was held that the act had a
broader application than the prohibition of restraints of trade unlaw-
ful at common law, and that no limitation or exception could be
added without placing in the act that which had been omitted by
Congress. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, i66 U. S.
290. Subsequent cases show that this construction has been repeat-
edly adhered to, and the decisions have been based on the object
and intention of the combination rather than the purpose of the
agreement. Wherever there has been a direct interference with
the free play of competition or interstate trade, they have found
an illegal restraint under the act. U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel
Co., 175 U. S. 211; Mbntague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38; Swift
& Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 395; U. S. v. Workingmna's Amalgamated
Council, 54 Fed. 994.
There was a question of jurisdiction presented in this case from
the fact that the restraint alleged would operate to destroy entirely
the plaintiff's business and thereby include intra-state as well as
interstate trade, and from the fact that the defendants were not
themselves engaged in interstate trade. But neither of these objec-
tions was tenable, for it can be readily perceived that the evil towards
which the statute looks is the "restraint of trade" among the States
without regard to the nature of the "contract, combination, etc.," by
which such restraint is accomplished, and without distinction between
classes; and, as it was said, "the acts must be considered as a whole,
and the plan is open to condemnation notwithstanding a negligible
amount of intra-state business might be affected in carrying it
out." "The fact that the means operated at one end, before physical
transportation commenced, and at the other end, after physical trans-
portation ended, was immaterial."
Congress has declared illegal "every" contract, combination,
etc., in restraint of trade among the several States, and there can
be little room for doubt in an unprejudiced mind that the combina-
tion of which the defendants were members was diredtly within the
letter of the act. The trade of the plaintiff was interstate, and
the purpose and effect of the plan of the defendants was to restrain
directly that trade. It is true that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was
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in its inception aimed at the evils of massed capital, and it is not
surprising that its present application has called forth some bitter
attacks by those who in their eager effort to throttle opposition in
its infancy have overlooked the broad principles that must govern
the judiciary in the faithful performance of its duty. But, without
comment as to whether decisions along this line evidence a dis-
regard of the shackled conditions of the laboring classes or abridge
in any way their rights of natural liberty, it is obviously certain that,
if any injustice exists, the remedy will not be found in the courts.
The Congressional records show that before this statute became a
law, and even during the last session of Congress, strenuous efforts
were made to exempt from its operation organizations of labor, and
that these efforts failed. The interdiction was made to include the
evil in its entirety, and is enforced accordingly.
